Regulating Financial Services

by Jerry O’Driscoll  

On Friday, the House of Representatives passed a bill to alter the regulation of financial services.  The Senate has yet to act.  Still, the House passage advances President Obama’s agenda to change how financial services are regulated.  

How to regulate large, complex financial institutions remains a sticking point between the two houses. On the big issue, however, no radical change is being proposed.  Major institutions continue to face various subsidies to risk taking and the government proposes to offset these incentives through regulation.  The doctrine that some institutions are so large and complex — and interconnected — that they are deemed too big to fail remains in place (if not enhanced). 

Dallas Fed President Calls for the End of Too Big to Fail

 by Jerry O’Driscoll  

Thursday at the Cato Monetary Conference, Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher called for the end of of the too-big-to-fail doctirine.  He identiifed the largest financial institutions as the source of excessive risk taking.  He also repeated his claim that these institutions interefere with the conduct of monetary policy. 

Fisher offered a middle ground between two strategies discussed on ThinkMarkets: steeper capital requirements or beaking them up.  He advocated forcing the largest banks to give up some of their riskiest operations.   In effect, that is forcible downsizing. 

This is a noteworthy call coming from within the Fed itself.

Big Bad Bank and Little Red Trustbuster

by Chidem Kurdas

A surprising new Small-Is-Beautiful movement is afoot.  Mario Rizzo, Jerry O’Driscoll, Harry Kaufman and others make a case for  breaking up too-big-to-fail financial institutions. As Mr. Kaufman puts it, otherwise those companies will become financial public utilities backstopped by the government.

It’s not likely that the 2008 crisis would have been prevented had top investment banks like Goldman Sachs been smaller. Traditional little banks are going down in droves. They fail because real estate loans are going bad. So many depository banks have gone under that the FDIC, the federal agency that insures deposits, itself ran out of money and asked to be bailed out by prepayment of bank premiums.

The same real estate bubble-and-bust hit larger banks through mortgage-backed securities. That’s regardless of size. Moreover, the government does not just bail out big investment banks. It bailed plenty of small savings & loan associations in the 1980s. The concept of “too-big-to-fail” is remarkably elastic.  Consider that GM and Chrysler both received federal aid. Chrysler is a lot smaller, but the political preference is to treat it as too-big-to-fail. Keeping banks relatively small will not stop such bailouts.

That said, there is a serious quandary.

A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire?

by Mario Rizzo

I am deeply impressed by Henry Kaufman’s opinion piece in today’s Wall Street Journal. I think he makes a very good case for  breaking up financial institutions deemed too-big-to-fail as opposed to the regulatory alternatives being contemplated. As much as it pains me to think about the government regulating the size of any firm, this may be an option that is far, far better than the politically feasible alternatives.  You can imagine the horrors that are out there being proposed.

Many of my readers will disagree but I am very willing to be persuaded otherwise.

Pain in the Fannie

by Chidem Kurdas

As Fannie Mae goes for its next withdrawal from the $200 billion kitty the US Treasury graciously made available to this government-created and -sustained mortgage financer, it may be useful to look beyond the current housing slump and consider what it augers for the future.

Having made yet another loss, the government-sponsored enterprise needs more money. A report Fannie filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission attributes the $19 billion third-quarter loss to the housing slump and mortgage defaults.  “We do not expect to operate profitably in the foreseeable future,” says  the company.

I always thought it was a great triumph of government public relations to come up with the sweet-sounding Fannie Mae moniker for an entity officially called the Federal National Mortgage Association.  Now I understand what the nickname really means—a pain in the taxpayers’ backside for the foreseeable future.

The business has been adversely affected by helping delinquent or imminently-in-default borrowers to modify their mortgages so as to reduce their monthly payments. As the economy recovers, defaults will decline, and presumably this aid will no longer be needed. But it is not clear when – or even if – the subsidy program will end.

In fact, it may be extended.  Fannie “may recommend supplementing the program with other initiatives that would allow us, pursuant to our mission, to assist more homeowners.”

Too Big to Fail Red Herring

by Chidem Kurdas

The Obama administration has perfected the fine art of taking a real issue and using it to justify a policy that will almost certainly make the problem worse. Claim to control medical costs, add another trillion dollar medical entitlement to truly break the bank—that sort of thing. Looks like we have another example coming.

The Treasury and House Financial Services chief Barney Frank are apparently cooking up legislation that will allow the government to wreck havoc with the creditors of large financial companies. This is in the name of imposing “market discipline” on institutions that may have to be rescued because they could endanger the system.

“The measure would make it easier for the government to seize control of troubled financial institutions, throw out management, wipe out the shareholders and change the terms of existing loans held by the institution,” according to the New York Times report.

Scroll back to September 2008. Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy, the credit market seizes up and stocks tank. What difference would the proposed law make in that situation? Lehman management is out and shareholders are wiped out anyway. Instead of regular bankruptcy, where the creditors exert influence, government directly takes over.

So the difference is that lenders will no longer be able to enforce their contractual claims. Oh yes, that will  be just the right remedy for a fragile credit market. You’ll tell lenders they’re toast! That will really get credit flowing.

We Have Come A Long Way

by Mario Rizzo  

This is more an intellectual experiment than a normal post. What I am asking you to do is to clear your mind of its cobwebs. Just “marvel” at the contrast between the classic statements of the limits of the federal government and the recent report in the Wall Street Journal:   

“The U.S. pay czar will cut in half the average compensation for 175 employees at firms receiving large sums of government aid, with the vast majority of salaries coming in under $500,000, according to people familiar with the government’s plans.

As expected, the biggest cut will be to salaries, which will drop by 90% on average. Kenneth Feinberg, the Treasury Department’s special master for compensation, also intends to demand a host of corporate governance changes at those firms.”

I am not here concerned with whether this is a good idea but I am simply in a state of naïve wonderment that we got to the point where this is legally possible.

Citi Phibro Selloff Shows Government Sham

by Chidem Kurdas

You’d think that the federal government wants Citigroup to return to financial health—if for no other reason to recoup the $45 billion of taxpayer money spent to shore up the bank in the credit freeze. You’d think the government wants a real effort to boost efficiency and profits. You’d be wrong.

What the Feds chose is a political charade. The pay czar objects to the $100 million compensation due to Citi’s star energy trader. Since the trader is contractually entitled to a share of the profits from Phibro, the phenomenally profitable energy trading subsidiary, there is no legal way not to pay him. So instead Citi is pressured to sell Phibro.

The bank complies. Occidental Petroleum snaps up the business at a bargain basement price. The WSJ quotes Occidental’s president as saying, “If you’ve got to sell, why should I pay a premium? What leverage does the seller have?” The lucky buyer added that Citi would never sell Phibro if it weren’t for pressure by the government.

Citi’s balance sheet is now in worse shape. It lost one of the few businesses that made money last year and had to sell under the worst possible circumstances, created by the government. Instead of slimming down by gradually getting rid of inefficient divisions so as to become a better-run company, the bank was forced to almost give away a valuable asset. And this to make it look like the government combated excessive pay.

What Kind of Doctor Is This?

by Gene Callahan

Let’s say you are suffering from a moderately severe cold; you’re operating at, say, 90% of your peak energy level, and so you go the doctor to see if he can help get you back to 100%. After examining you, the doctor says:

“The point of our therapy is to approach the current malady in the spirit that we’ll do whatever it takes to turn things around; if what has been done so far isn’t enough, do more and do something different, until health starts to flow and the patient starts to recover.”

Wouldn’t you be inclined to sprint out the door?

Avoiding Deflation Without Bailouts

by Mario Rizzo  

I have not posted in a while since I have been on vacation. During that time an interesting dispute has arisen among friends Tyler Cowen, David Henderson, Arnold Kling, Peter Boettke, Bob Murphy, Steve Horwitz and others over whether Ben Bernanke was right to bail out specific banks. (Some of this has gotten mixed up with the issue of what Brian Boitano would have done — oops, I should say Milton Friedman.)  

I think the question could be simply stated in two parts. First, is it possible to prevent general deflation and not bail out big banks? Second, if so, what would be the effect on the economy of bringing the banks to bankruptcy court while preventing outright deflation?