European Austerity in Perspective

by Chidem Kurdas Attempts to rein in government spending necessarily have unpleasant side effects.  Thus the Dutch government collapsed amid budget talks to control the deficit.   And British national output appears to be shrinking. Keynesians and advocates of the Obama administration’s colossal budget see this as vindication for unrestrained government spending. But in fact … Continue reading European Austerity in Perspective

Oil Price Politics Implication

by Chidem Kurdas My previous post about government restrictions on oil and gasoline transportation drew comments saying prices are set in a world  market and the effect of United States policy is negligible. Numerous economic and geopolitical forces influence the price of oil, no question. That does not change the fact that the Jones Act … Continue reading Oil Price Politics Implication

Keynes, the Future and Present Austerity

by Chidem Kurdas In 1930, John Maynard Keynes dashed off an amazing prophecy. Extrapolating from the productivity gains of the past centuries, he came to the bold conclusion that the fundamental economic problem of scarcity would fade away in 100 years or so. Thanks to technological innovation and the accumulation of capital, the ancient condition … Continue reading Keynes, the Future and Present Austerity

Spending Cuts and Politics of Bureaucracy

by Chidem Kurdas I just read The Politics of Bureaucracy by Gordon Tullock, one of the best books written on the behavior of bureaucrats. Although originally published in 1965, it remains very much relevant today, especially as the debt deal currently in Congress could bring spending caps on programs administered by numerous bureaucracies. These entities … Continue reading Spending Cuts and Politics of Bureaucracy

Two Takes on Political Donations

by Chidem Kurdas The Wall Street Journal reports that the biggest campaign spender of 2010 is a public sector union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, which lavished $87.5 million on helping Democrats. This single union outspent the US Chamber of Commerce, which came second with $75 million. Reading the WSJ article … Continue reading Two Takes on Political Donations

Equality Destroyed in the Name of Equality

by Chidem Kurdas Law and government should treat people equally. This old principle may seem obvious and firmly in place, but in fact it’s much violated. Instead, the focus is on income distribution. Thus Robert H Frank in the NYT points to the bad effects of income inequality – like people spending too much money … Continue reading Equality Destroyed in the Name of Equality

Constitutionalism: Point/Counter-Point

By Chidem Kurdas and Thomas McQuade In our previous post, Thomas argued that voter feedback is weak in constraining the exercise of legislative power. Chidem countered that the other fundamental constraint, the constitution, is therefore all-important. Commentators were divided, with cogent arguments pro and con. We continue this discussion. Chidem:  Constitutionalism is the idea of … Continue reading Constitutionalism: Point/Counter-Point

Two Takes on Class Conflict

by Chidem Kurdas A presentation at this week’s NYU Colloquium by Ralph Raico, professor of history at the State University of New York Buffalo, generated a thought-provoking discussion.  His paper traces the early-to-mid 19th century development  of the classical liberal theory of class conflict—which long predated Marx and is different from class conflict in the Marxian … Continue reading Two Takes on Class Conflict

Money and Banking in a Free Society

by Jerry O'Driscoll    At the Coordination Problem, Pete Boettke drew our attention to James M. Buchanan's paper, "Economists Have No Clothes". It's a short piece, chock full of insights.  I want to draw on some not raised by Pete.   Buchanan observes that protagonists are prone to claim "that 'the market' (or 'capitalism') either works or does not work … Continue reading Money and Banking in a Free Society

The Calculus of Consent II

by Gene Callahan In Chapter 5, "Organization of Human Activity," Buchanan and Tullock discuss what constitutes a "rational" choice concerning social arrangements. They write, "We have assumed that the rational individual, when confronted with constitutional choice, will act so as to minimize his expected costs of social interdependence, which is equivalent to saying that he … Continue reading The Calculus of Consent II